Ethnic armed groups operating along both the China–Myanmar and Thai–Myanmar borders—including those aligned with the military council—are now aggressively cracking down on online scam syndicates.
Colonel Khun Okkar, Chairperson of the Pa-O National Liberation Army (PNLO/NCA/S), said that China and the United States have entered into a competitive race to suppress online scam operations, and that ethnic armed groups are intensifying arrests out of fear of being caught between the geopolitical pressures of these two major powers.
“Online scamming has become a global problem. China is the original creator, in a sense. But when China could no longer control its own issue and began taking it back, the U.S. also stepped in, saying it wants to crack down too—mainly because it fears China’s growing influence. So now, both powers are competing in this crackdown. Everyone is afraid of being squeezed between them, so they are shouting, ‘We are cracking down too!’ The Thai Prime Minister says he will launch operations. DKBA and BGF say they are doing it. Now, the KNLA, under the KNU, claims they are doing it too. So it’s become a situation where some follow China’s interest, and some follow the U.S.’s interest,” he said.
He added that China’s “green light” for an anti-scam campaign along the China–Myanmar border had enabled the Three Brotherhood Alliance (MNDAA, TNLA, AA) to launch Operation 1027, which has not only targeted scam compounds but also captured several towns under military junta control—is significantly reshaping Myanmar’s political landscape.
The military council recently accused the Karen National Union (KNU) of involvement in over 100 buildings inside KK Park, a major scam compound in Mae Htaw Thalay, Myawaddy Township, claiming these were linked to KNU and announcing that the site had been destroyed.
Analysts note that despite the military council publicly cracking down on online scam syndicates—which generate enormous profits—it is itself deeply involved in these operations. This sudden wave of arrests is seen as an attempt to avoid international punitive actions.
A Myanmar political analyst told IMNA that the junta has been quietly extracting top-level scam operators while publicly arresting minor figures to create the appearance of enforcement.
“What they’re doing now isn’t because they genuinely want to clean things up—they’re doing it only because they’re under pressure. If you look closely, the real operators, the big ones, quietly disappear. Have you seen their arrests in the news? No. Instead, the junta parades low-level people in front of the media to make headlines. “If there had been a real crackdown, people would be surprised to see scam centers operating openly just yesterday and suddenly disappearing today. But that’s not what we’re seeing,” he said.
On November 12, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) of the US Department of the Treasury announced sanctions against leading figures within the DKBA, linking them to online scam operations.
Likewise, the DKBA and the Karen Border Guard Force (BGF), both of which cooperate closely with the military council, have recently begun arresting scam workers and operators.
A veteran journalist told IMNA that the intensifying U.S.–China rivalry over scam suppression could seriously affect the junta’s revenue streams and place pressure on DKBA and BGF, who have been aiding the junta in suppressing the revolution. This pressure, he said, could shift the dynamics of the resistance across Karen and Mon states.
“Now that the U.S. says it will arrest them, they’re acting like they already knew and are trying to anticipate it. DKBA and BGF are in a position where they must balance between Min Aung Hlaing, China, Thailand, and even the KNU. If they lean too closely toward one side, that side will arrest them. Look at the recent case in Min Latt Pan—KNU presented seized documents and equipment as evidence. If that evidence shows real scam activity, DKBA will be in even tighter trouble,” he said.
Political observers note that China is using “carrot-and-stick diplomacy” toward both the junta and dominant ethnic armed groups within its sphere of influence—applying pressure through law enforcement while offering selective cooperation.
At the same time, political analysts say that the Beijing–Washington rivalry has forced some armed groups—including those benefiting heavily from scam revenues—to begin cracking down on the operations they themselves helped run.
