Banya Hongsar, Canberra : November 7th is just in a few days. This day will be interpreted as one of either darkness of light in Burmese political history. However, it is time to think beyond the November 7th general elections in the country, and consider instead what lies in store for Burma both internally and internationally. A small country like Burma cannot advance its regional power unless the nature of running the country is changed. China is looking to capitalize on its national interest in Burma at every opportunity. China’s investment in Burma, worth US $ 2.7 billion, is at stake, and will greatly influence the relationship between China and the newly formed Burmese government in the post election period. From another front, over 2 million migrant workers and displaced Burmese people in Thailand will be pressing for their own issues, and the new government will have to deal with the Royal Thai government as it seeks further cooperation in the repatriation of displaced people from its border camps back into Burma. The newly formed, most likely military-linked Burmese government will be under pressure from western governments, including the United States of America and the European Union, to release political prisoners and allow opposition organizations to operate freely after the elections. Thinking beyond the day of the upcoming elections is necessary for those who are committed to working for constitutional and institutional change in Burma. I will explore some possible scenarios for Burma’s post election-political landscape.
Four topic will be discussed in this article;
– China’s interest in Burma
– The State Peace and Development Council’s (SPDC) – Union Solidarity and Development Party’s (USDP) new policy for functional change
– The National League for Democracy (NLD) and the National Democratic Front’s (NDF) new battle ground
– Ethnic leaders’ voices in national politics
20 years’ worth of US and EU- led western pressure on Burma has not worked, and the west is seeking a new ‘engagement policy’ with reserved ‘sanction measures’ toward Burma’s regime. China has favored a pro-engagement policy of contributing financial and military assistance and Burma remains unchanged and undemocratic. The US has given full support for Burma’s road to democracy over the past twenty years. The Burmese people owe gratitude to the US government and its people for this support. However, the Burmese people have to stand up for themselves and their rights for the next 10 to 20 years. The US’s policy on Burma will be tested again for the next few years, as to whether it can counter-balance on China’s influence on Burma. It is time that Burmese leaders from both the ruling military elite and from opposition forces think of the impact of China’s interest in Burma, and whether or not China’s influence conflicts with Burma’s national interest. This is the reason why thinking beyond the elections underpins the future survival of Burma’s road to democracy under a united national spirit. Burma’s national interest is not divided, but rather unites all the disparate ethnic groups in Burma. China is only interested in a weaker Burma, because a strong, united Burma does not fit in to its economic strategy.
Thinking beyond the elections both among Burmese and non-Burmese leaders is in greater national interest, both in terms of security and for Burma’s future. As it stands now, The Asia Times reported on September 16th that two new pipelines from Burma to China have been planned, one for crude oil and one for natural gas, have been planned, both of which stretch well over 2 thousand miles and will be finished by 2013; the article also alleged that China’s foreign investments in make up 11.5% of total foreign investments in Burma. China gains but Burma pains.
China will not tolerate to any armed group who harms its national and economic interests in Burma. Burmese leaders both exiled and living in-country cannot escape the obligations of the bi-literal agreements between China and Burma, and the investment agreements signed by the current military government. China has used its economic power beyond its borders a great deal in the last 10 years, and Burma is the source of China’s closest available resources.
A functional change might possibly be seen on a small scale in the post-election period in Burma. Every sign indicates that the current ruling military regime, under the guise of its newly formed political party the USDP, will be elected will and mobilize its post election legitimacy under the new constitution. Opposition forces led by the NLD have had only limited avenues for the last 20 years to force the ruling generals into dialogue, and NLD leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi will be looking a new strategy that could foster her forces when she is released from house- detention in mid November. It is very likely that the ruling SPDC-USDP will begin building alliance with other minor parties or ethnic leaders interested in who are committed with the ‘tune of the SPDC-USDP’ line. Should this happen, local newly elected members of parliament will have the opportunity to enact gradual changes on a local administrative level within ethnic states and regions in the realms of health, education and local economies. During the campaigns leading up to the elections, many Burmese-civilian candidates pledged that, if elected, they will run a smarter and stronger debate within the parliamentary framework that could pressure the ruling military generals for further compromises on local issues. Local members of parliament will likely be seeking greater autonomy from the government over issues of health, education and business to satisfy local constituencies. If both the State and National parliaments could use their mandates within the parliamentary circle, functional and constitutional changes will be in place, but still very limited manner compared to what many of Burma’s observers have been expected so far.
The NLD, a well established opposition party in founded in1988 and the NDF, a newly formed party started by former senior politicians from the NLD, will be seeking new grounds to foster its campaign for the next election sooner or later. The NLD, if they want to flourish, must work with the strong support of Burma’s ethnic national forces. I called these forces the ‘third force’ in Burma. The second force, in contrast, is led by former NLD senior politicians and former student activists. In all likelihood, Rangoon-based senior Burmese civilian an politicians led by the NLD will be seeking greater support from this third force, either formally and informally. A visible opposition force could be vital in pressuring the newly formed government for further national dialogue. It is vital that this third force is united in spirit with Burma’s other activist groups, and that alliances are formed to foster smarter campaigns in the future.
The voices of ethnic leaders deserve to be in Burma’s national politics in the future; indeed, a A stronger Burma cannot be built without them. A sense of trust must be established between Burmese and ethnic leaders. China will mock Burma if the country is weak and the leaders lack regional power bases. A united Burma will build a strong regional power that could decrease China’s exploitation of Burma. China is not a democratic state. China cannot be a champion of democracy while it rules under a one party-communist system.
Only a united force of Burma comprised of both ethnic and Burmese leaders could resist further bullying of China on Burma. United ethnic forces must prove that they are united in a desire for constitutional change. Their voice must reflect the desires of local people and citizens of the country.
Thinking beyond the election is vital if opposition forces are prepared to confront the newly formed military-civilian affiliated government after the 7th of November. Time is running out for opposition forces both inland and in exile. The Australian National University’s trained Burma’s observer, Mortem B. Pederson warned in July 2009, “twenty years of the same old ‘safe’ policies have led nowhere. Whatever this current transition process is and will become, it is the most significant political shift in a generation and therefore an opportunity that simply must not be wasted through continued inflexibility or a lack of courage or imagination”.
Burmese activists both home and abroad must think beyond the November 7th elections, and question what is next. Burma could become ‘a country of prostitution’ as warned by the country’s founding father in the post-independence period, General Aung San, unless a united force between ruling Burma and ethnic leaders is finally achieved to work towards the goal of a new democratic political institution.
